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THE BUYER-SECURED PARTY CONFLICT AND SECTION
9-307(1) OF THE UCC: IDENTIFYING WHEN A BUYER
QUALIFIES FOR PROTECTION AS A BUYER IN ORDINARY
COURSE
INTRODUCTION
The buyer in ordinary course of business' (BIOC) exception of
section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code2 (Code) allows a
qualifying buyer to cut off a lender's fully perfected interest 3 in an
item of collateral securing a loan. 4 As such, it represents a powerful
1. The Uniform Commercial Code defines buyer in ordinary course as "a person
who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary
course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind." U.C.C. § 1-201(9)
(1977).
2. Id. § 9-307(1). This section provides in pertinent part that -[a] buyer in
ordinary course of business... takes free of a security interest created by his seller
even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its
existence." Id.
3. A security interest is "an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation." Id. § 1-201(37). The security
agreement is always effective against the debtor. T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial
Code Commentary and Law Digest 9-201[A][2]-[3] (1978). For maximum legal
protection against third parties, however, the security interest must be perfected. Id.
I 9-303[A], at 9-152. The act of perfection, which consists of publication of the
creditor's interest in the collateral, gives the world notice that the debtor does not
have unencumbered ownership of the goods. L. Denonn, Secured Transactions
Under the UCC 39 (rev. ed. 1970); T. Quinn, supra, 9-101[A][4][e]; Knapp,
Protecting the Buyer of Previously Encumbered Goods: Another Plea for Revision of
UCC Section 9-307(1), 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 861, 872 (1973). A security interest may be
perfected in one of three basic ways. The two principal methods are filing and
possession. The third is automatic perfection by operation of law, which is limited to
certain types of collateral and circumstances. B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transac-
tions Under the Uniform Commercial Code 2.5, at 2-16 (1980); W. Davenport &
D. Murray, Secured Transactions 115 (1978); L. Denonn, supra, at 39; T. Quinn,
supra, 1 9-101[A][4][e], -302[A][1]-[3]; Knapp, supra, at 872; see U.C.C. § 9-303
(1977). In order for a security interest to be perfected, it must attach. U.C.C. § 9-
303(1) (1977); T. Quinn, supra, I 9-303[A][1]. Attachment is the point at which a
security interest first arises. U.C.C. § 9-303 official comment 1 (1977). Under § 9-
203, it occurs when there is an effective security agreement, value has been given and
the debtor has rights in the collateral. Id. § 9-203(1); Anzivino, When Does a Debtor
Have Rights in the Collateral Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 61
Marq. L. Rev. 23, 23-24 (1977). In the 1962 version of the Code, these provisions are
in § 9-204. U.C.C. § 9-204 (1962); T. Quinn, supra, 9-203[A][3].
4. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) official comment 1 (1977). The concept of buyer in
ordinary course of business represents an important exception to the doctrine of
caveat emptor. 1 N.Y. L. Rev. Comm'n, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code,
Leg. Doc. No. 65, at 227 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 Report].
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assault 5 on the sanctity of the Article 9 security interest.' Whether a
buyer has qualified as a BIOC, therefore, is a vitally important deter-
mination. 7
A typical section 9-307(1) scenario is as follows: B, a buyer,8 agrees
to buy a specific model television set from Acme Appliances, Inc. (S) 0
and tenders a check for the full price. After B leaves, S designates a
particular television set to be delivered to B the next week. 10 S is able
to maintain a full line of television sets and other appliances in his
inventory by virtue of a financing arrangement with a bank (L)
under which the appliances serve as collateral for the loan.'2 The
security agreement' 3 and financing statement 4 provide L with a
5. One commentator referred to this exception as a "massive loophole" to which
a security interest in business inventory is subject. 62,000 Tons of Sand, 14 U.C.C. L.
Letter, June 1980, at 1 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C. L. Letter].
6. Section 9-201 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act a
security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201 (1977). A security
agreement is "an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest." Id.
§ 9-105(1)(1). Section 9-201 "states the general validity of a security agreement." Id.
§ 9-201 official comment. Exceptions are only allowed by specific provision of the
Code. See id. The buyer in ordinary course of business exception is an example of
such a provision.
7. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 265, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 529
(Sup. Ct. 1968); Antigo Co-op Credit Union v. Miller, 86 Wis. 2d 90, 91, 271
N.W.2d 642, 643 (1978).
8. The Uniform Commercial Code defines a buyer as "a person who buys or
contracts to buy goods." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a) (1977).
9. A seller is defined by the Uniform Commercial Code as "a person who sells or
contracts to sell goods." Id. § 2-103(1)(d).
10. Designation identifies the goods to the contract. Id. § 2-501(1)(b).
11. The Code defines goods as " 'inventory' if they are held by a person who
holds them for sale or lease . . . or if they are raw materials, work in process or
materials used or consumed in a business." Id. § 9-109(4). Whether goods are
inventory is a function of whether they are held for sale in the ordinary course of
business. Id. § 9-109 official comment 3.
12. Floor-plan financing is a common method of secured financing under which
a lender advances funds to enable a dealer to purchase and replenish his inventory.
R. Speidel, R. Summers & J. White, Teaching Materials on Commercial and Con-
sumer Law 217 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as R. Speidel]; Note, Secured Trans-
actions-Importance of Possession or Title to Buyer in the Ordinary Course of
Business, 14 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 695, 695 n.4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Possession or
Title]; see European-Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sheriff of Nassau, 97 Misc. 2d 549,
550, 411 N.Y.S.2d 851, 852-53 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56
Misc. 2d 261, 262, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526-27 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Holstein v. Greenwich
Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 843 (R.I. 1979).
13. Although the security agreement expressly secures the proceeds of sale, the
1972 version of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that proceeds are
automatically included. U.C.C. § 9-203(3) (1972). This is in contrast to the 1962
version of § 9-203(1)(b), which at a minimum required that the word "proceeds" be
mentioned in the agreement. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (1962); T. Quinp, supra note 3,
9-203[A][1][d]. The reason this change was made was that "it is assumed that the
parties [intended to include proceeds] unless otherwise agreed." U.C.C. app. II § 9-
203, reasons for 1972 change (1977).
14. The financing statement is the paper that is placed in the public records. T.
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security interest in both the inventory and the proceeds of sale.' 5  The
financing statement has been filed16 in accordance with Code perfec-
tion requirements.'" Before the television is delivered to B, S defaults
on the loan, and L moves to repossess everything in S's inventory. 8
Included in the inventory is the television designated for B, which is
still on the premises pending delivery.
Quinn, supra note 3, 9-203[A][5], at 9-96. The 1972 version of the Code provides
that each financing statement must include the signature of the debtor, the names
and addresses of both parties and a description of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) &
official comment 1 (1972); T. Quinn, supra note 3, 1 9-402[A][1], at 9-265. Either
the security agreement itself or the standard abbreviated form, UCC-1, may be filed.
U.C.C. § 9-402 official comment 2 (1977); T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-203[A][5], at
9-96, 9-402[A][4]. Usually it is the latter. Id. I 9-402[A][1), at 9-265.
15. The Code provides that " '[p]roceeds' includes whatever is received upon the
sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds .... Money,
checks, deposit accounts, and the like are 'cash proceeds'. All other proceeds are 'non-
cash proceeds'." U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1977). Floor-plan financing arrangements usu-
ally contemplate that the proceeds of sale will be applied toward repayment of the
loan. Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 843 n.2 (R.I. 1979); 2
G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 26.1, at 677 (1965); T. Quinn,
supra note 3, 9-307[A][1] (Supp. 1981); R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 211, 217;
Knapp, supra note 3, at 874; Possession or Title, supra note 12, at 695 n.4. Proceeds,
however, may also be used to replenish the seller's inventory. J. Honnold, Cases and
Materials on the Law of Sales and Sales Financing 599 (4th ed. 1976). A financing
arrangement that includes proceeds is an example of a "floating lien." See 2 W.
Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code 701-02 (1964).
A "floating lien," which the Code validates, is a security interest that is maintained
throughout the inventory cycle. Id. It begins with the raw materials, continues in the
goods as they go through the process of change and become finished goods, follows
into proceeds and goes back to newly purchased raw materials. 1 G. Gilmore, supra,
§ 11.7, at 359; W. Hawkland, supra, at 701-02; J. Honnold, supra, at 598-99; T.
Quinn, supra note 3, 9-108[A][2]; R. Speidel, supra note 8, at 210-11; see Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 268, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 532-33 (Sup. Ct.
1968).
16. Part 4 of Article 9 of the Code sets forth the rules on filing. U.C.C. §§ 9-401
to -408 (1977). States may adopt one of three alternative filing systems provided in
section 9-401. Id. § 9-401; see T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-401[A][1]-[3]. All three
alternatives involve filing with the Secretary of State. U.C.C. § 9-401 first alternative
subsection (1)(b) (1977); id. second alternative subsection (1)(c); id. third alternative
subsection (1)(c). They differ primarily as to the types of collateral that must be filed
in local county offices. Compare id. first alternative subsection (1)(a) (including,
inter alia, timber or minerals) with id. second alternative subsections (1)(a)-(b)
(including, inter alia, equipment used in farming operations, timber or minerals)
with id. third alternative subsections (1)(a)-(c) (including, inter alia, equipment used
in farming operations, timber or minerals, and providing for filing in county where
debtor resides or has a place of business). The official comments discuss the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each of the three alternatives. Id. § 9-401 official com-
ments. Other Code sections in part 4 outline the formal requisites of financing
statements, id. § 9-402, what constitutes filing, id. § 9403, and termination state-
ments. Id. § 9-404.
17. Filing is one method by which perfection may occur. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)
(1977).
18. A secured party has the right to take possession of collateral upon the debtor's
default. Id. § 9-503.
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The situation becomes a priority battle19 between L and B, with
each claiming rights in the television: B as a buyer in ordinary course
of business under section 9-307(1);2o L as a secured party under sec-
tion 9-306(2).91 If section 9-307(1) is applicable, B will take delivery
of the television free of L's security interest. L, however, still has a
right to the proceeds of the sale. 22 If section 9-307(1) is not applica-
ble, L will be able to repossess the television as well as claim the
proceeds.2 3
The determination of whether B is a buyer in ordinary course of
business depends on the answers to two questions: (1) Who is a
BIOC; 24 and (2) when does a buyer attain this preferred status?25 A
buyer qualifies as a BIOC pursuant to Code section 1-201(9)2o if he in
"good faith"2 7 and "without knowledge" that the sale to him violates a
19. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745,
747-48 (3d. Cir. 1979); European-Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sheriff of Nassau, 97
Misc. 2d 549, 550-51, 411 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852-53 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Integrity Ins. Co. v.
Marine Midland Bank-W., 90 Misc. 2d 868, 868-69, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (Sup. Ct.
1977); Adams v. City Nat'l Bank, 565 P.2d 26, 27-28 (Okla. 1977); Holstein v.
Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 843-44 (R.I. 1979).
20. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1977); see supra note 2.
21. Section 9-306(2) of the Code provides that generally "a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition . . .and
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the
debtor." U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1977).
22. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 946,
952 (D.N.J.), aff'd in relevant part, 653 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1981); International
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 492, 211
S.E.2d 430, 433 (1974); Associates Discount Corp. v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa.
609, 612, 220 A.2d 621, 623 (1966); B. Clark, supra note 3, 3.4, at 3-18; E. Reiley,
Guidebook to Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.3, at 8-7 (1981).
23. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1977). Although L may claim both proceeds and
collateral, there may be only one satisfaction. Id. official comment 3.
24. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][7], at 9-189; see, e.g., Taft v. Jake
Kaplan, Ltd. (In re Dexter Buick-GMC Truck Co.), 2 Bankr. 253, 255 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1980); Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 A.D.2d 35, 36, 312
N.Y.S.2d 317, 318 (1970); European-Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sheriff of Nassau, 97
Misc. 2d 549, 552, 411 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
25. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-135 (Supp. 1981); Skilton, Buyer
in Ordinary Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(And Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 16; see Herman v. First Farmers State
Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 478, 392 N.E.2d 344, 345 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v.
Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 238-39, 208 N.W.2d 97, 106 (1973).
26. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977); see supra note 1.
27. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977). Good faith is defined as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." Id. § 1-201(19). Article 2 of the Code contains a
definition of good faith that superimposes a requirement of "observance of reason-
able commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" on the Article 1 requirement
of honesty in fact. Id. § 2-103(1)(b). This definition applies only to merchants. See id.
The courts disagree over whether to apply the Article 1 or Article 2 standard of good
faith when dqaling with a merchant buyer in an Article 9 situation. Skilton, supra
note 25, at 24-28. Compare Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612
F.2d 745, 751-52 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Article 1 definition), and Sherrock v.
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secured party's interest,28 "buys in ordinary course"28 "from a person
in the business of selling goods of that kind."'10  In addition, the
security interest must be "created by [the] seller,"13' in accordance
with section 9-307(1). It looks as though B qualifies as a BIOC.
Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 651 (Del. 1972) (same), with Swift v. J.I.
Case Co., 266 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (applying Article 2
definition), and Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 A.D.2d 35, 37-38,
312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 320 (1970) (same).
28. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977); e.g., Rex Fin. Corp. v. Marshall, 406 F. Supp.
567, 581 (W.D. Ark. 1976); O.M. Scott Credit Corp. v. Apex Inc., 97 R.I. 442, 448,
198 A.2d 673, 677 (1964); Cash Loan Co. v. Boser, 34 Wis. 2d 410, 419, 149 N.W.2d
605, 610 (1967). One commentator argues that the "no knowledge" requirement is
implicit in the good faith requirement. Felsenfeld, Knowledge as a Factor in Deter-
mining Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 246, 248-
49 (1967).
29. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977). To be considered buying in ordinary course of
business, the buyer should buy from the seller's usual place of business, on a day and
at a time that is customary in the area and typical in the trade. 1 R. Anderson,
Uniform Commercial Code §§ 1-201:22, :25 (2d ed. 1970); Skilton, supra note 16, at
29-30. Examples of non-qualifying sales are bulk sales, sales in liquidation, and sales
at excessively low prices. Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d
632, 637, 350 N.E.2d 590, 592, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (1976). Whether a buyer is
found to buy in the ordinary course depends on the circumstances of the case as of the
purchase date. Compare Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 505 F.
Supp. 946, 949-52 (D.N.J.) (commercial construction buyer's purchase of 150,000
tons of sand from commercial seller of sand was not bulk sale but sale in ordinary
course of business), aff'd in relevant part, 653 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1981), and Tanbro
Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 636-37, 350 N.E.2d 590,
592-93, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262-63 (1976) (fabric converter's purchase of excess goods
from another converter was customary in the trade and therefore in ordinary course
of business), with National Bank of Commerce v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 446
P.2d 277, 280, 282 (Okla. 1968) (purchase of an automobile from a seller who
operated an automobile repair business and did not have a new car dealer's license
was not in ordinary course of business), and Whitmire v. Keylon, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1203, 1207 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (purchase of a one-half interest
in a houseboat was not in ordinary course of business).
30. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977). The requirement limits the BIOC exception to
sales that are made by sellers regularly engaged in selling such goods and excludes
casual sales. R. Anderson, supra note 29, § 1-201:26. Compare American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Mar-K-Z Motors & Leasing Co., 11 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1048-49, 298
N.E.2d 209, 210-11 (1973) (seller held to be in business of selling automobiles where
articles of incorporation specified that seller was in business of leasing and selling),
aff'd, 57 Ill. 2d 29, 309 N.E.2d 567 (1974), with Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car
Rental Sys., 35 A.D.2d 35, 39, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321 (1970) (seller held not to be in
business of selling automobiles because periodic sales were incidental to leasing
business). One commentator explains the requirement as a preference for buyers who
buy in normal trading channels. Skilton, supra note 25, at 23.
31. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1977); B. Clark, supra note 3, § 3.4[3]; Skilton, supra
note 25, at 7-9. Commentators have criticized the fact that the reach of § 9-307(1) is
limited to security interests created by the buyer's seller. Dugan, Buyer-Secured
Party Conflicts Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 46 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 333, 345-47 (1975); Knapp, supra note 3, at 884-85; Vernon, Priori-
ties, The Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Financing, 4 B.C. Indus. &
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The question of when a buyer becomes a BIOC is not as easy to
answer as the question of who may become one. 32 A sales transaction
involves specific and identifiable points in time, each of which repre-
sents a unique event in the Code scheme. 33 These include time of
contracting, identification, passage of title, delivery, receipt and ac-
ceptance. 34 Because the Code fails to give guidance as to when BIOC
status arises, 35 it is arguable that a buyer could become a buyer in
ordinary course at any one of these times.
Jurisdictions differ as to the most appropriate point at which to
recognize BIOC status. Neither courts nor commentators have ad-
vanced time of contracting. Delivery and receipt have been expressly
rejected. 36 This leaves passage of title 37 and identification, 38 both of
Com. L. Rev. 531, 534-36 (1963). Thus if a buyer buys from a seller who bought the
goods from another seller who encumbered the goods, the buyer will be denied the
protection of § 9-307(1). Exchange Bank v. Jarrett, 588 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Mont.
1979); National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 388, 236 A.2d 484, 485-86
(1967); Dugan, supra, at 345-46; Knapp, supra note 3, at 884; Vernon, supra, at 535.
This result has been criticized on the basis that one who buys goods encumbered by
other than the immediate seller is just as innocent and subject to the same equities as
one who buys directly from the seller who creates the security interest. Even if the
buyer tries to search the records for outstanding liens, he will learn nothing because
the security interest will have been filed under the debtor's name, of which the buyer
is ignorant. Dugan, supra, at 347; Knapp, supra note 3, at 887. Commentators
therefore argue that the language "created by his seller" should be deleted from § 9-
307(1) to expand its protection. Id. at 892; Vernon, supra, at 536. Commentators
also argue for the elimination of the exclusion of buyers of farm goods from the
protection of § 9-307(1). Dolan, Section 9-307(1)- U. C. C. 's Obstacle to Agricultural
Commerce in the Open Market, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 706, 735-36 (1977); Dugan,
supra, at 337-44.
32. U.C.C. L. Letter, supra note 5, at 1.
33. See T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-135 to -136 (Supp. 1981).
34. See id.; Skilton, supra note 25, at 16.
35. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-135 to -136 (Supp. 1981);
Skilton, supra note 25, at 15-21.
36. Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 8, 10
(1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 494-96, 211 S.E.2d 430, 434-35 (1974); Herman v. First Farmers State
Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 478-79, 392 N.E.2d 344, 345-46 (1979); Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1968);
Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1979); see Martin
Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 751 (3d Cir. 1979); Tanbro
Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 636, 350 N.E.2d 590, 592-
93, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262-63 (1976); Makransky v. Long Island Reo Truck Co., 58
Misc. 2d 338, 339-40, 295 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241-42 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
37. See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133
Ga. App. 488, 492-94, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1974); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine
Midland Bank-W., 90 Misc. 2d 868, 870-71, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320-21 (Sup. Ct.
1977); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 238-39, 208 N.W.2d 97,
106-07 (1973). International Harvester Credit Corp., although decided under the
title approach, recognized the possibility of deciding "without resort to the technical
niceties of definitions in the Sales article of the U.C.C." 133 Ga. App. at 494, 211
S.E.2d at 434.
38. Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir.
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which have been utilized in the cases, as viable points in time for
determination of BIOC status. If passage of title is favored, B will lose
because the Code provides that title generally passes on delivery,39 and
in this case, delivery has not yet taken place. If, however, the court
favors identification, B will win because the television was identified
when S designated a particular television for delivery to B.40
The question of when B becomes a BIOC also arises when B buys on
credit.41 To illustrate, the hypothetical should be modified so that B,
instead of paying by check, agrees to pay on an installment basis.42 B
executes a note, formalizing his obligation to pay for the television
over time,43 and a security agreement, giving S the right to repossess
the goods should B default.44 S may sell the security agreement and
the note, which together are termed "chattel paper," 45 to either the
inventory lender or a retail financer. 46 Although security agreements
1979); Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1979).
39. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1977).
40. See id. § 2-501(1)(b).
41. See Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 8, 10
(1978); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534
(Sup. Ct. 1968); T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-134 to -135 (Supp.
1981); Skilton, supra note 25, at 76-78.
42. See Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 176, 580 P.2d 8, 8
(1978); Wickes Corp. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 363 So. 2d 56, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133
Ga. App. 488, 489, 211 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1974); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56
Misc. 2d 261, 262, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526-27 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Associates Discount
Corp. v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 611, 220 A.2d 621, 623 (1966); T. Quinn,
supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-134 (Supp. 1981); R. Speidel, supra note 12, at
217-18; Skilton, supra note 25, at 77.
43. See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133
Ga. App. 488, 489, 211 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1974); R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 217;
Levie, Security Interests in Chattel Paper, 78 Yale L.J. 935, 936 (1969).
44. See Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 176, 580 P.2d 8, 8
(1978); Wickes Corp. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 363 So. 2d 56, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133
Ga. App. 488, 489, 211 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1974); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56
Misc. 2d 261, 262, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Associates Discount Corp.
v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 611, 220 A.2d 621, 622 (1966); T. Quinn, supra
note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-134 (Supp. 1981); R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 217;
Levie, supra note 43, at 936; Skilton, supra note 25, at 78; supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
45. Chattel paper is defined as "a writing or writings which evidence both a
monetary obligation and a security interest in ... specific goods." U.C.C. § 9-
105(1)(b) (1977). Chattel paper therefore results from the credit purchase of an item
evidenced by a promissory note and the security agreement. R. Speidel, supra note
12, at 217-18; see Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 176-77, 580
P.2d 8, 8-9 (1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs.
Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 489, 211 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1974); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note
15, § 27.1, at 718; Levie, supra note 43, at 935-37.
46. 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 27.1, at 719-20; J. Honnold, supra note 15, at
645; Levie, supra note 43, at 955-56.
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often provide that S will sell the chattel paper to L, 47 when in need of
cash S is more likely to sell to the retail financer, 48 who then becomes,
for the purposes of the Code, the chattel paper purchaser.40 Upon
default by either S on the loan agreement with L, or B on the install-
ment contract, determination of the priorities between L and the
chattel paper purchaser in the chattel paper and the underlying goods
may turn on the determination of when BIOC status arises.50
This Note reviews the purposes and policies underlying the Code as
a whole, and in particular the BIOC exception and Article 9. It then
analyzes the six possible points on the transactional continuum to
determine which is most satisfactory in terms of the underlying pur-
poses and policies of the Code, predictability of results, and equity.
Finally, this Note concludes that of the six possible points in time,
identification satisfies the above criteria most successfully.
I. PURPOSES AND POLICIES OF THE CODE
To ensure that businesses function as planned 5' and to minimize the
possibility of disputes, 52 parties to commercial contracts must be able
to determine their rights and obligations with a reasonable degree of
certainty.5 3 Because "commerce knows nothing of State bounda-
ries,"' 54 it is also important that the applicable law be uniform when a
transaction is conducted across state lines. 55 The commercial case
law56 of the nineteenth century and the "uniform" commercial stat-
47. J. Honnold, supra note 15, at 645; R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 218; Skilton,
supra note 25, at 77; see 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 27.1, at 718-20.
48. 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 27.1, at 720; J. Honnold, supra note 15, at
645.
49. See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Corp., 133
Ga. App. 488, 489, 211 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1974); U.C.C. § 9-308 (1977); 2 G.
Gilmore, supra note 15, § 27.1, at 728.
50. See Skilton, supra note 25, at 76-78; see, e.g., Rex. Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am.
Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 177, 580 P.2d 8, 9 (1978); International Harvester Credit
Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs., 133 Ga. App. 488, 492, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1974);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 269, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 533 (Sup.
Ct. 1968).
51. R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 5, 646; see Hawkland, Uniform Commercial
"Code" Methodology, 1962 U. Ill. L.F. 291, 294.
52. R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 5, 646; M. Chalmers, Address on the Codifica-
tion of Mercantile Law, 19 Law Q. Rev. 10, 15 (1903).
53. Finance Co. of Am. v. Hans Mueller Corp., 471 F.2d 546, 552 (4th Cir.
1972); Lockyer v. Offley, 99 Eng. Rep. 1079, 1083 (1786); R. Speidel, supra note 12,
at 5, 646; M. Chalmers, supra note 52, at 14-15; see Hawkland, supra note 51, at
294, 320.
54. M. Chalmers, supra note 52, at 18.
55. Id.; see R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 657; Hawldand, supra note 51, at 294.
56. The commercial case law system developed in the wake of the Industrial
Revolution. Hawkland, supra note 51, at 293-94. The number of cases grew rapidly.
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1040-41 (1961);
Hawkland, supra note 51, at 293-94. Because a precedent-based case law system can
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utes that followed failed to achieve the necessary certainty and
uniformity. The Uniform Commercial Code was intended to remedy
this failure. 5
The Code drafters attempted to add a measure of predictability to
commercial law, 59 while ensuring sufficient flexibility in its applica-
tion. 60  These aims are expressed in the Code's stated purposes and
policies: "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing com-
mercial transactions;" "to permit the continued expansion of commer-
cial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;"
and "to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."a' The
Code also mandates that it "be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies."0' 2 This directive per-
only function with a manageable number of precedents, the burgeoning number of
cases caused the system to break down. Gilmore, supra, at 1041. In addition, the
decisions were not uniform from state to state. Id. at 1043-44; Hawkland, supra note
51, at 293-94. This patchwork of nonuniform decisions impeded interstate commer-
cial activity. Id. at 294.
57. The uniform state statutes were enacted in an attempt to remedy the failure
of the commercial case law system. Gilmore, supra note 56, at 1043-44; Hawkland,
supra note 51, at 296. The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws, formed in the 1890's, presented the Uniform Sales Act in 1906. R. Speidel,
supra note 12, at 18. This statute, the principal commercial act, was adopted by only
36 states. Hawkland, supra note 51, at 297. Others were adopted by only a handful
of states. Id. In addition, the statutes were not comprehensive. For example, the
Uniform Sales Act covered only 60% of sales transactions. Id. at 299. Finally,
because the statutes were not constructed systematically, they sometimes conflicted
with each other. Id. at 298-99. Thus, the "uniform" statutes failed to satisfy the needs
of an increasingly mercantile society. Id. at 299.
58. Commonwealth v. Jett, 230 Pa. Super. 373, 375, 326 A.2d 508, 509 (1974);
Hawkland, supra note 51, at 299-300; see Redisco, Inc. v. United Thrift Stores, Inc.,
363 F.2d 11, 14 (3d Cir. 1966); Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa. Super. 506, 510, 184 A.2d
24, 26 (1962); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc.,
572 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. 1978); Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. Ill. L.F. 321, 330-31.
59. Hawkland, supra note 51, at 299-300, 320.
60. U.C.C. § 1-102 official comment 1 (1977); Kripke, supra note 58, at 329-30;
e.g., In re Stegman, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 225, 228-29 (S.D. Fla. 1974);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 264-65, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 529
(Sup. Ct. 1968); Erb v. Stoner, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 25, 31 (1958). Although the Code
was designed "to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation," it "provide[s] its own
machinery for expansion of commercial practices." U.C.C. § 1-102 official comment
1 (1977). One such mechanism is § 1-102(3), which states that -[t]he effect of
provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement." Id. § 1-102(3); see id. § 1-102
official comment 2.
61. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1977).
62. Id. § 1-102(1). Courts are well aware of this important mandate. E.g.,
Universal Lightning Rod, Inc. v. Rischall Elec. Co., 24 Conn. Supp. 399, 401, 192
A.2d 50, 51 (Cir. Ct. 1963); Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Indus., Inc., 82 I11.
App. 3d 662, 671, 403 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1980); Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home Center,
Inc., 32 Mich. App. 10, 13, 188 N.W.2d 9, 11 (1971); Putnam Ranches, Inc. v.
Corkle, 189 Neb. 533, 535, 203 N.W.2d 502, 503 (1973); Baillie Lumber Co. v.
Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 353, 167 S.E.2d 85, 92-93 (1969).
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tains not only to the purposes and policies underlying the Code as a
whole, but also to those of its component sections. 63
The Uniform Commercial Code has aspects of a "true code," in that
it has its own stated purposes and policies, preempts the field of
commercial law, and is constructed systematically.0 4 Accordingly, it
is recommended that courts modify their legal method when constru-
ing the Code. As a threshold matter, it must be determined whether
the answer to a particular problem is contained within the Code.05 If
it is, courts should look to the text of the Code as the "best evidence of
what it means."06 If the Code does not address a specific situation,
however, courts should use analogy. 7 It is also suggested that courts
should attribute less precedential value to their own decisions 8 and
give weight to Code decisions of other states.19 This recommendation
is based on the idea that "the uniform 'right' decision ranks higher
than the local 'best' decision."7 0
Article 9 of the Code was designed "to provide a simple and unified
structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured
financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater
certainty.'71 Pre-Code secured financing had been characterized by
conflicting and arbitrary requirements for each of the numerous fi-
63. U.C.C. § 1-102 official comment 1 (1977).
64. Hawkland, supra note 51, at 299; see Gilmore, supra note 56, at 1042-43.
65. In re Hardin, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 857, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1972); Herington Livestock Auction Co. v.
Verschoor, 179 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Iowa 1970); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v.
Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky. 1961).
66. Hawkland, supra note 51, at 319; accord Gilmore, supra note 56, at 1043.
67. Gilmore, supra note 56, at 1043; Hawkland, upra note 51, at 314-18; see
U.C.C. § 1-102 official comment 1 (1977). In determining whether a potentially
applicable Code provision should apply in a given situation, a court should consider
whether the underlying policy of the section applies to the case at hand. See
Hawkland, supra note 51, at 317. Courts are also directed to supplement the provi-
sions of the Code with "principles of law and equity," unless "displaced by the
particular provisions of [the] Act." U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977). These principles include,
for example, the law merchant, estoppel, coercion and mistake. Id.; Hawkland,
supra note 51, at 312-13.
68. Hawkland, supra note 51, at 318-20. Because court decisions do not become
part of the legislation, but are merely persuasive, the role of stare decisis Is somewhat
limited. See Gilmore, supra note 56, at 1043.
69. E.g., A.J. Armstrong Co. v. Janburt Embroidery Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 246,
259, 234 A.2d 737, 744 (Law Div. 1967); Commonwealth v. National Bank & Trust
Co., 469 Pa. 188, 194, 364 A.2d 1331, 1335 (1976); Hawkland, supra note 51, at 319-
20.
70. Hawkland, supra note 51, at 319.
71. U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment (1977); accord Wabasso State Bank v.
Caldwell Packing Co., 308 Minn. 349, 357, 251 N.W.2d 321, 325 (1976); see, e.g.,
Redisco, Inc. v. United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d 11, 14 (3d Cir. 1966); Needle v.
Lasco Indus., Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 1105, 1107, 89 Cal. Rptr. 593, 594 (1970);
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Michigan Bank, N.A., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 745, 750
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972).
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nancing devices.7 2  Article 9 brought consistency to this field of law
by recognizing distinctions between devices only when of functional
utility.7 3
Section 9-201 of the Code provides that a "security agreement is
effective... between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral
and against creditors. ' 74 This rule states the general validity of secur-
ity agreements, 75 which are the means by which security interests are
created. 76 A security interest gives a lender the right to take posses-
sion of goods serving as collateral in the event of a debtor's default. 77
In commercial financing, one of the most frequently used lending
arrangements is floor-plan financing, under which the debtor's inven-
tory serves as collateral for the loan.78 Although such an arrangement
does not normally prohibit the seller from selling his inventory, 79 the
lender may include in the security agreement certain restrictions,80
such as a requirement that the seller obtain express authorization from
the lender before completing a sale.
8 1
72. U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment (1977). Examples of the various pre-Code
financing devices include the chattel mortgage, the conditional sale, and the trust
receipt. Id. The evolving complexity of available financing transactions reflected in
numerous statutory provisions resulted in higher costs and much uncertainty as to the
rights of the parties. Id. Furthermore, despite the large number of financing forms,
gaps in financing certain types of transactions remained. Id.
73. Id.; Alaska State Bank v. General Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Alaska
1978); L. Denonn, supra note 3, § 5.1, at 34; 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 9.2, at
290, § 11.1, at 333; see W. Davenport & D. Murray, supra note 3, § 3.01, at 87.
"The Code has eliminated the older, technical and restrictive categories of security
agreements. Gone are the definitional difficulties and transactional fictions of the
chattel mortgage, the conditional sale, and the trust receipt. In their stead is a
general set of rules for the creation of a security interest in the secured party."
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Michigan Bank, N.A., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 745, 750
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972); accord Redisco, Inc. v. United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d
11, 14 (3d Cir. 1966). See T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-101[A], for a discussion of the
basic changes Article 9 made to pre-Code secured financing law.
74. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1977).
75. Id. § 9-201 official comment.
76. Id. § 9-105(1)(1).
77. Id. § 9-503; T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-503[A], at 9-311.
78. See supra note 12.
79. The secured party expects that the goods will be sold and that his interest wvill
then attach to the proceeds. 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 228; 2 G. Gilmore, supra
note 15, § 26.1, at 677; Possession or Title, supra note 12, at 695 n.4; seeJ. Honnold,
supra note 15, at 598-99; R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 217.
80. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 294 (2d ed. 1977); Possession or
Title, supra note 12, at 700.
81. See Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 843 n.2 (R.I.
1979). The security agreement may also provide, for example, that retail, but not
wholesale, sales are allowed, see O.M. Scott Credit Corp. v. Apex Inc., 97 R.I. 442,
444, 198 A.2d 673, 675 (1964), or that sales must be in the ordinary course of




This extension of credit on the strength of underlying inventory
enables sellers to acquire the merchandise they sell. 2 In the absence
of the protection afforded security interests by the Code, it is presum-
able that certain lenders might not be as willing to lendA3 In such a
case, certain sellers would not be in a position to sell. 84 This result
would interfere with our exchange economy, in which "[s]ales of
goods and contracts for their sale are the most common and most
significant of all commercial transactions." 8" To avoid this result,
Article 9 incorporates an "unambiguous bias in favor of the secured
party" 86 and makes the security agreement a "very powerful docu-
ment." 87
Exceptions to the general rule recognizing the validity of security
agreements are therefore allowed only under special circumstances
and by express provision.8" One such provision is the BIOC exception
of section 9-307(1),8§ which was designed to allow buyers of goods to
take free of security interests created by their sellers, even though
those interests are perfected.90 This provision serves the dual purpose
82. See supra note 12.
83. R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 73-74.
84. Id. at 74.
85. Id. at 644.
86. Dugan, supra note 31, at 333; see Copeland v. Stewart, 124 Cal. Rptr. 860,
866 (Ct. App. 1975); McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 260 Md.
601, 624, 273 A.2d 198, 209 (1971).
87. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-201[A], at 9-84.
88. U.C.C. § 9-201 official comment (1977). One such provision is § 9-301,
which allows certain persons to take priority over unperfected security interests. Id. §
9-301; W. Davenport & D. Murray, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 95; T. Quinn, supra note
3, 1 9-301[A][1J-[10] (1978 & Supp. 1981). Other circumstances where the secured
party might not prevail are covered under § 9-312, which determines priorities
among conflicting security interests in the same collateral. U.G.C. § 9-201 official
comment (1977). Lastly, the security interest may be defeated by certain claimants
who are given protected status, id., including purchasers of chattel paper, id. § 9-
308; T. Quinn, supra note 3, 11 9-308[A][2]-[5], and purchasers of instruments.
U.C.C. § 9-309 (1977); T. Quinn, supra note 3, 11 9-309[A]-[A][1] (1978 & Supp.
1981). This group of protected buyers also includes buyers of goods, U.C.C. § 9-201
official comment (1977), known as buyers in the ordinary course of business. Id. § 9.
307; T. Quinn, supra note 3, 11 9-307[A][1]-[13] (1978 & Supp. 1981).
89. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1977). The BIOC exception contained in § 9-307(1) has
been referred to as the principal exception to the general rule of validity of security
agreements under § 9-201. Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475,
477, 392 N.E.2d 344, 345 (1979). The BIOC exception has also been called "the
buyer's best friend." T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][2]. Additionally, the buyer
in ordinary course has been termed "one of the favorites in the dramatis personae of
the UCC." Skilton, supra note 25, at 2.
90. U.C.C. § 9-307 official comment 1 (1977); B. Clark, supra note 3, 3.4, at 3-
18; T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][2]; Skilton, supra note 25, at 12.
[Vol. 50668
BUYER IN ORDINARY COURSE
of "encourag[ing] the marketability of goods"9' and "support[ing] the
reliance interest of buyers who assume that they have clear title to the
goods they purchase."9 12 Buyers expect that their sellers have the right
to sell the goods they offer for sale . 3 In addition, because restrictions
in the security agreement do not appear in the filed financing state-
ment, 94 the buyer has no way of discovering restrictions negotiated
between the lender and the seller-debtor 5 Therefore, because buy-
ers may be at a disadvantage when inventory serves as collateral, the
BIOC exception of section 9-307(1), "rest[ing] on principles of justice
and utility,"'9 6 "favor[s] the safeguarding of sales transactions over the
safeguarding of secured transactions. 917
91. B. Clark, supra note 3, 3.4, at 3-18; accord In re Kline, I U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 628, 634 (E.D. Pa. 1956); 2 N.Y. L. Rev. Comm'n, Report and
Record of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code, Leg. Doc. No. 65, at 1018
(1954).
92. B. Clark, supra note 3, 3.4, at 3-18; accord Knapp, supra note 3, at 887; see
Dugan, supra note 31, at 346.
93. Haynes v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 432 F. Supp. 763, 767 (W.D. Va.
1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib.
Co., 284 F. Supp. 121, 125 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide,
235 F. Supp. 599, 604 (E.D. Ark. 1964); Bitzer-Croft Motors, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank &
Trust Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1, 12, 401 N.E.2d 1340, 1348 (1980); Sebrite Corp. v.
Transouth Fin. Corp., 272 S.C. 483, 487, 252 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1979). The policy of
§ 9-307(1) is that "where the debtor has express, implied, or apparent authority to
sell the collateral, a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes free of the security
interest." Comm'n on Unif. State Laws, New York Annotations to Uniform Commer-
cial Code and Report to Legislature of New York State, Leg. Doc. No. 65, at 275
(1961). The authority to sell can flow from the status of the goods as inventory,
Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 843 n.2 (R.I. 1979); Mat-
thews v. Arctic Tire, Inc., 106 R.I. 691, 694, 262 A.2d 831, 833 (1970); 1955 Report,
supra note 4, at 228, as well as the fact that the seller has claimed proceeds. Id.; see
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
94. Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 752 n.3 (3d
Cir. 1979); Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc., 36 A.D.2d 6, 9, 317 N.Y.S.2d 542,
545 (1971); Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 A.D.2d 35, 38, 312
N.Y.S.2d 317, 320 (1970).
95. Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc., 36 A.D.2d 6, 9, 317 N.Y.S.2d 542, 545
(1971); Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 A.D.2d 35, 38, 312 N.Y.S.2d
317, 320 (1970); Sebrite Corp. v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 272 S.C. 483, 486-87, 252
S.E.2d 873, 875 (1979). Because buyers gain nothing from searching the files for
liens, they are not considered to lack good faith for failing to do so. Hempstead Bank
v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 A.D.2d 35, 38, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 320 (1970).
96. Skilton, supra note 25, at 3.
97. Id. at 4. Section 9-307(1) of the Code has its roots in the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act provision governing buyers in the ordinary course of trade, Unif. Trust
Receipts Act § 9(2)(a) (1933), 9C U.L.A. 255 (1957), and the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act provision governing buyers for value in the ordinary course of business.
Unif. Conditional Sales Act § 9 (1918), 2 U.L.A. 15 (1922). Thus, the BlOC excep-
tion represents the continuation of a statutory tradition of protecting buyers. Holstein
v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1979); 1955 Report, supra




Article 9's attempt to accommodate the conflicting rights of buyers
and secured lenders has been termed "a finely integrated plan for the
determination of the priorities and equities of the parties to secured
transactions."' 8 Its principal mechanism, section 9-307(1), is usually
effective in adjusting the tension between buyers of inventory and
secured lenders who claim rights in the inventory. 9 Because it is
unclear when BIOC status arises, 100 however, the buyer's ability to
prevail under this exception is questionable when he has not yet
obtained possession of the goods he has purchased. B will want to
obtain possession of the television he has contracted to buy. Similarly,
if S defaults on his loan, L will want to exercise his Code reclamation
rights.' 0' In order to resolve this conflict, it is necessary to determine
exactly when a buyer may properly partake of the protection provided
to buyers in the ordinary course. The resolution of this question will
lead to increased uniformity and predictability, two important man-
dates handed down by the drafters of the Code.
II. THE POINTS IN TIME
A sales transaction involves a series of identifiable events. In the
hypothetical in the Introduction, the first step, the making of the
contract, occurs when B agrees to purchase the television. The next
step, identification of the goods to the contract, occurs when S desig-
nates a particular television set for delivery to B by either noting on
the sales agreement the serial number of B's new television or actually
setting a television aside. The next step in the transaction, passage of
title, occurs when the television is delivered. Delivery is accomplished
by S's act of loading the television into his delivery truck for shipment
to B, as per prior agreement. Receipt occurs when B permits the
delivery people to bring the television into his house. Acceptance, the
final step, occurs -after a reasonable period for inspection, when B,
satisfied with the television, does not reject it. Although these events
usually occur successively, they will be addressed in order of increas-
ing importance to determination of BIOC status.
A. Acceptance
Acceptance represents the end point on the transactional contin-
uum. 102 The Code provides that it may occur in three different
98. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
99. See id.; Note, Merchant-Buyer's Good Faith Duty to Inquire Under 9-307: A
Confusion of Concepts, 27 U. Miami L. Rev. 524, 528-29 (1973).
100. See B. Clark, supra note 3, 3.4[2], at 3-21 to -22; T. Quinn, supra note 3,
9-307[A][8] (1978 & Supp. 1981); Skilton, supra note 25, at 15-19.
101. See supra note 18.
102. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-136 (Supp. 1981). This is of
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ways. 10 3 The first method, express acceptance, occurs when B signi-
fies by word or act that he is satisfied with the television.0'4 Accep-
tance may also occur by operation of law if the buyer fails to make an
effective rejection after a reasonable opportunity to inspect.'0 5 Fi-
nally, a buyer may be held to have technically accepted'10 by an act
inconsistent with S's ownership.10 7
There is no authority for requiring acceptance of goods before
conferring BIOC status.' 0 s Courts may avoid acceptance because the
precise moment of acceptance is not easily pinpointed. Assuming
neither express nor technical acceptance, the period of time during
which acceptance may occur varies depending on the amount of time
reasonably necessary to inspect the goods.'10 A reasonable period has
been held to be as short as one day" 0 and as long as nine months after
receipt."' Because the determination of what constitutes a reason-
able time depends on the particular circumstances of each ease,"1- a
requirement of acceptance would add an unnecessary variable to
determination of BLOC status.
course barring revocation of acceptance, which is available under limited circum-
stances. See U.C.C. § 2-608 (1977).
103. U.C.C. § 2-606(1) (1977); see, e.g., Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400
F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1968); Linscott v. Smith, 3 Kan. App. 2d 1, 4, 587 P.2d 1271,
1274 (1978); Fred J. Miller, Inc. v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 265 Md. 523, 527,
290 A.2d 527, 529 (1972).
104. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(a) & official comment 1 (1977); see, e.g., Pratt v. Winne-
bago Indus., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 709, 714 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F.
Supp. 760, 767 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'd mem., 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978); Rozmus v.
Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 123-24, 224 A.2d 782, 784
(1966).
105. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b) (1977); see, e.g., T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags
of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1980); Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 241
Ark. 62, 65, 406 S.W.2d 142, 144 (1966); Linscott v. Smith, 3 Kan. App. 2d 1, 4, 587
P.2d 1271, 1274 (1978).
106. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-606[A][1].
107. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(c) (1977); e.g., Gerard Constr. Inc. v. Motor Vessel Va.,
490 F. Supp. 475, 476-77 (W.D. Pa.), afJ'd, 636 F. 2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1980); Linscott v.
Smith, 3 Kan. App. 2d 1, 4, 587 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1978); see Rozmus v. Thompson's
Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 123-24, 224 A.2d 782, 784 (1966).
108. See T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-136 (Supp. 1981).
109. See, e.g., T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 357
(5th Cir. 1980); Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1968);
La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 403, 548 P.2d 825, 832
(1976); White Devon Farm v. Stahl, 88 Misc. 2d 961, 964-65, 389 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727-
28 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Don's Marine, Inc. v. Haldeman, 557 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977).
110. Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1968).
111. La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 403, 548 P.2d 825,
832 (1976).
112. U.C.C. § 2-513 official comment 3 (1977); e.g., T.J. Stevenson & Co. v.
81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 357 (5th Cir. 1980); Miron v. Yonkers Raceway,
Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1968); White Devon Farm v. Stahl, 88 Misc. 2d 961,
964-65, 389 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727-28 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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Furthermore, use of acceptance as a reference point postpones
BIOC status until late in the transaction." 3 This result minimizes the
effect of the Article 9 BIOC exception, thereby undermining the
policy of protecting buyers from hidden interests in goods." 4  In
addition, requiring acceptance would penalize the buyer who, exer-
cising his Article 2 rights," 5 delays acceptance until he has completed
a thorough inspection.116 To protect himself against L's right to
repossess if S defaults during the period that B is inspecting, B may
have to expressly accept before completing a thorough inspection. B's
rights against S, however, become severely circumscribed at the point
of acceptance.1 7  Thus, a requirement of acceptance would place B
in the untenable position of having to choose between either the
protection afforded by Article 2 or that of Article 9.
B. Delivery and Receipt
Unlike acceptance, delivery and receipt are readily discernible
events. Delivery consists of the seller's conduct in putting and holding
the goods at the buyer's disposition." 8 In contrast, receipt entails
buyer's gaining possession of the goods. "o Receipt, therefore, usually
presupposes delivery. 20 In fact, "the seller may. . . fulfill his obliga-
113. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-136 (Supp. 1981).
114. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
115. U.C.C. § 2-513 (1977).
116. See R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 951-52.
117. See T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-607[A][1], at 2-355 to -356. Before accept-
ance, the buyer may reject if the goods fail to conform to the contract in any way.
U.C.C. § 2-601 (1977). If, however, the buyer accepts the goods, § 2-607(2) provides
that he is precluded from rejecting them. Id. § 2-607(2). He may, however, revoke
his acceptance, but only where the defect substantially impairs the value of the
goods. Id. § 2-608.
118. U.C.C. § 2-503 (1977). The general rule of § 2-503 provides that "the seller
put and hold conforming goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer any
notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery. The manner, time
and place for tender are determined by the agreement and this Article ...." Id.
§ 2-503(1). The nature of the sales contract will determine the seller's delivery
obligation. T. Quinn. supra note 3, 2-503[A][2]. In a shipment contract, in which
the seller is not required to deliver the goods to a particular destination, his obliga-
tion is discharged when he "put[s] the goods in the possession of . . . a carrier."
U.C.C. § 2-504(a) (1977). In a destination contract, the seller's delivery obligation is
not discharged until he tenders the goods at the point of destination. Id. § 2-503(3).
When goods are in possession of a bailee, § 2-503(4) applies. Id. § 2-503(4). Code
delivery rules also appear in other sections of Article 2. E.g., id. § 2-307 (delivery In
single lot or several lots); id. § 2-308 (absence of specified place for delivery); id. § 2-
507 (effect of seller's tender; delivery on condition).
119. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) (1977). "The act or state of possessing is a condition of
facts under which one can exercise power over property ... to the exclusion of all
other persons ...." Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-W., 90 Misc. 2d
868, 870, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
120. See U.C.C. § 2-103 official comment 2 (1977).
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lions to 'deliver' even though the buyer may never 'receive' the
goods" 21-for example, when goods are destroyed in transit after the
seller has transferred them to a common carrier. Although the con-
cepts thus are not synonymous,' 22 they are often used interchange-
ably.' 2 3 Courts and commentators routinely reject imposition of a
delivery or receipt requirement' 24 in determining BIOC status.
It could be argued, however, that delivery should be a prerequisite
to a finding of BIOC status because it represents "the time when seller
has finally committed himself in regard to specific goods." '2 This
theory underlies the Code rule that title generally passes on deliv-
ery.126  Another Code subsection, however, provides that title may
pass as early as the time of contracting,12 7 because under certain
121. Id.
122. Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Gaucher, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 148, 386 N.E.2d
1052, 1056 (1979); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-\V., 90 Misc. 2d 868,
871, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
123. In considering whether the buyer was a BIOC, the court in Herman v. First
Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 478, 392 N.E.2d 344, 346 (1979), used the
term "received delivery." In Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176,
178, 580 P.2d 8, 10 (1978), the court, in holding that possession was not necessary,
relied on Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525,
534 (Sup. Ct. 1968), which had held that delivery was not necessary for BIOC status.
124. Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 8, 10
(1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 494-96, 211 S.E.2d 430, 434-35 (1974); Herman v. First Farmers State
Bank, 73 IMl. App. 3d 475, 478-79, 392 N.E.2d 344, 345-46 (1979); Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1968):
Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1979); see Martin
Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 751 (3d Cir. 1979); Tanbro
Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 636, 350 N.E.2d 590, 592-
93, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262-63 (1976); Makransky v. Long Island Reo Truck Co., 58
Misc. 2d 338, 339-40, 295 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241-42 (Sup. Ct. 1968); 1955 Report, supra
note 4, at 232; 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 26.6, at 696; T. Quinn, supra note 3,
9-307[A][8] (1978 & Supp. 1981); Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the
Concept of Possession in the Marketing and Financing of Goods, 56 Tex. L. Rev.
1147, 1155-56 (1978); Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for
Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 87 Yale L.J. 907, 950-53 (1978); Warren, Cutting Off
Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469,
473 & n.23 (1963). One commentator argues that possession appears to be necessary
for attainment of BIOC status in a § 2-403(2) entrustment, such as a bailment.
Smith, Title and the Right to Possession Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10
B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 39, 60-61 (1968). Other courts and commentators have
interpreted Smith as saying that possession is a requirement in the Article 9 BIOC
context as well. See Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 239, 208
N.W.2d 97, 106-07 (1973); Dolan, supra, at 1155 n.35; Possession or Title, supra
note 12, at 698 n.23. Such an interpretation, however, is unwarranted; Smith's
comment was expressly limited to § 2-403(2). See Smith, supra, at 60-61.
125. U.C.C. § 2-401 official comment 4 (1977).
126. See id.
127. Id. § 2-401(3)(b).
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circumstances, the seller may be committed to a sale of specific goods
at that time. 28  Thus, delivery does not always represent the point
when S is committed and therefore should not be a requirement for
BIOC status.
The rationale of the passage of title on delivery rule is also unper-
suasive in the context of the BIOC exception because that section does
not include the delivery requirement found in its predecessor, a provi-
sion of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. 129 It is most likely that the
Code drafters' omission of this requirement was intentional.'10 Other
Code provisions that protect buyers expressly require delivery,13'
"highlight[ing] the absence of the delivery requirement in section 9-
307(1)."' 132 A court, by imposing a delivery requirement, would
therefore be taking an action in contravention of legislative intent and
prerogative. 133
It has been suggested that receipt may be necessary for BIOC status
because the definition of buyer in ordinary course in section 1-201 (9)
states that buying "includes receiving goods ... under a pre-existing
contract for sale.' 34 In its study of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the New York Law Revision Commission speculated that the receipt
clause may have been inserted to mark the point when a buyer be-
comes sufficiently committed to payment of the price to be considered
a buyer in the ordinary course of business.135  Courts that have re-
jected the necessity of receipt, however, have apparently found the
buyer sufficiently committed when he has done everything he is obli-
128. Id. § 2-401 official comment 4.
129. Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1979); 1955
Report, supra note 4, at 232; 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 26.6, at 696; Dolan,
supra note 124, at 1155-56; Warren, supra note 124, at 473 & n.23; Possession or
Title, supra note 12, at 698. The Uniform Trust Receipt Act's version of the BIOC
exception, Unif. Trust Receipt Act § 9(a)(2) (1933), 9C U.L.A. 255 (1957), protected
only buyers "to whom goods [were] sold and delivered." Id. § 1, 9C U.L.A. at 230.
130. Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1979); 1955
Report, supra note 4, at 232; 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 26.6, at 696; Dolan,
supra note 124, at 1155-56; Warren, supra note 124, at 473 & n.23.
131. E.g., U.C.C. § 7-205 (1977); id. § 7-504(2)(b); id. § 9-301(1)(c).
132. Dolan, supra note 124, at 1188; accord 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 239-40;
Jackson & Peters, supra note 124, at 950; Skilton, supra note 25, at 20.
133. In Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Says. Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 244
N.W.2d 243 (1976), the court refused to require that a financing statement be refiled
when the secured party changed its name. The court stated: "We decline to engraft a
court-established requirement upon the provisions of the U.C.C. which regulate
commercial transactions within the marketplace. We leave such action to the Legis-
lature, should it choose to do so." Id. at 209, 244 N.W.2d at 245; accord Leech v.
White (In re Thermal Barriers, Inc.), 8 Bankr. 294, 296 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981).
134. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977); 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 235-36.
135. 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 235-36.
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gated to do prior to receipt.' 36  Moreover, the New York Law Revi-
sion Commission noted that if its conjecture concerning the purpose of
the receipt clause were correct, "the rule appears to be conserva-
five."137  Finally, a requirement of receipt, or even delivery, would
unduly delay determination of BIOC status,'3 8 in contravention of the
section 9-307(1) policy of protecting buyers' 39 and the basic Code
policy of encouraging sales of goods. 40
C. Time of Contracting
The time of contracting, the earliest point at which a buyer could
conceivably sever a secured party's security interest, is usually not
seriously considered as an alternative.' 4' It is not entirely clear,
however, why it is in disuse. In its favor is the Code definition of
buyer contained in section 2-103(1)(a): "a person who buys or con-
tracts to buy goods."1 42 As has been noted, however, "[i]t is not an
easy jump . . . to conclude that the definition of the term 'buyer'
should influence the definition of the separate term 'buyer in ordinary
course.' "143 Moreover, the BIOC definition in section 1-201(9) refers
only to a person who buys.' 44 The New York Law Revision Commis-
sion has suggested that the absence of a reference to "contracting to
buy" indicates that use of time of contracting to determine BIOC
status may be appropriate only in the case of a present sale,' 4 where
the buyer becomes the owner immediately.' 46  Moreover, time of
136. See Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 8, 10
(1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 496, 211 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1974); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73
Ill. App. 3d 475, 480, 392 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1979); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine
Midland Bank-W., 90 Misc. 2d 868, 870-71, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
137. 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 235-36.
138. Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1979); T.
Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-136 (Supp. 1981); Dolan, supra note 124,
at 1157.
139. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
140. Possession or Title, supra note 12, at 698 & n.25; see supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
141. See Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 238-39, 208 N.W.2d
97, 106-07 (1973); T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-136 (Supp. 1981).
142. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a) (1977) (emphasis added); see T. Quinn, supra note 3,
9-307[A][8], at S9-136 (Supp. 1981). One commentator argues that the definition
of buyer as one "who contracts to buy" does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that an "executory buyer" qualifies as a BIOC as soon as the contract for sale is made.
Skilton, supra note 25, at 15; see Jackson & Peters, supra note 124, at 952 n.162.
143. Jackson & Peters, supra note 124, at 952 n.162.
144. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977).
145. 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 236.
146. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-106[A][1]; see, e.g., O'Brien v. Isaacs, 32 IlI. 2d
105, 107, 203 N.E.2d 890, 891 (1965); Groth v. Stillson, 20 Mich. App. 704, 707, 174
N.W.2d 596, 598 (1969); Miles v. Starks, 590 S.W.2d 223, 225-26 (Tex. Civ. App.
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contracting is of limited utility even in a present sale, because it
coincides with either time of identification147 or passage of title,1
48
both of which are more readily accepted by the courts.
When there is not a present sale, the rights of a buyer are too
immature at the time of contracting to justify attainment of BIOC
status. 49 Section 2-105(2) of the Code requires that "[g]oods. . .be
both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass." 5 0
Goods may exist at time of contracting without being identified, '5 as
when B has agreed to buy a television, but before S has designated a
specific television for delivery to B. Additionally, the goods that B has
contracted to buy may not yet exist in the form in which they will be
sold.152 For example, B may order a cake. 51" Before S sets aside some
flour and begins baking, section 2-105(2) would prevent passing of an
interest to B. 5 Therefore, under Article 2, before goods are existing
and identified, a buyer is a buyer in name only; 15 his interest in the
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980). This is in contrast to a future sale, in which
the buyer becomes the owner at a future date. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-106[A][1].
Both present and future sales are considered contracts of sale and are therefore
covered by Article 2. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1977); e.g., Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc.,
138 Ga. App. 31, 32, 225 S.E.2d 691, 693 (1976); Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 603-04, 332 A.2d 1, 8 (1975); Melms v.
Mitchell, 266 Or. 208. 216 n.2, 512 P.2d 1336, 1340 n.2 (1973).
147. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 749-51
(3d Cir. 1979); Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 844 (R.I.
1979). Identification occurs at the time of contracting if the sale is of goods already
existing and identified. U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(a) (1977).
148. See Jones v. One Fifty Foot Gulfstar Motor Sailing Yacht, 625 F.2d 44, 49
(5th Cir. 1980); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co.,
133 Ga. App. 488, 493, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1974). Title passes at time of
contracting when (i) delivery is to be made without moving the goods, (ii) the goods
are identified, and (iii) no documents are to be delivered. U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b)
(1977).
149. See T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-136 (Supp. 1981).
150. U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (1977).
151. See Melms v. Mitchell, 266 Or. 208, 216 n.2, 512 P.2d 1336, 1340 n.2 (1973);
City of Richmond v. Petroleum Marketers, Inc., 221 Va. 372, 374, 269 S.E.2d 389,
390 (1980).
152. In such a situation, the goods, for example, chocolate and sugar, or quartz
crystals, will ultimately be sold as manufactured products-that is, candy and
watches respectively. W. Davenport & D. Murray, supra note 3, § 2.09, at 67-68; T.
Quinn, supra note 3, 9-315[A].
153. See T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-315[A].
154. U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (1977). Although the goods need not be in a deliverable
state to be identified, id. § 2-501 official comment 4; Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht
Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1979), one commentator has indicated that
identification does not occur by the mere manufacturing of goods from which a
certain buyer's order will be filled. 2 R. Anderson, supra note 29, § 2-501:9, at 64. In
fact, identification does not occur until the first step of production using the raw
materials, and only if the production is done according to specifications contained in
the buyer's contract for the goods. Id. §§ 2-501:4, at 61, :9 at 64.
155. See Dolan, supra note 124, at 1156.
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goods has not yet arisen.'5 6 Thus, determination of BIOC status at
time of contracting would give the buyer rights through section 9-
307(1) at a point in time at which Article 2 does not recognize an
interest. 157 Moreover, because under Article 9 a secured party may
have a perfected security interest in the raw materials Is-that is, the
flour-prior to identification of the materials to the buyer's contract,
use of time of contracting in the BIOC context would also unduly
interfere with Article 9's policy of giving validity to security inter-
ests. 159
D. Passage of Title
Passage of title is the point in time that has engendered the most
controversy with respect to determination of BIOC status. On the one
hand, the Code minimizes the importance of title.' 60 As stated in an
official comment, "the rights and remedies of the parties to the con-
tract of sale, as defined in [Article 2]... rest on the contract and its
performance.. . and not on stereotyped presumptions as to the loca-
tion of title." 161 On the other hand, the Code provides that a" 'sale'
consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price."' 162  Because qualification as a buyer in ordinary course re-
156. See U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (1977).
157. Cf. Dolan, supra note 124, at 1192-93 & n.243 (passage of title should not
govern § 9-307(1) situations because "title does not govern the rights of the buyer
under Article 2").
158. R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 212. The security interest in the raw materials
carries over into the finished goods. U.C.C. §§ 9-315 (1977); \W. Davenport & D.
Murray, supra note 3, § 2.09, at 67-68; T. Quinn, supra note 3, at 9-315[A].
159. See supra notes 74-75, 86-87 and accompanying text.
160. E.g., Anderson v. First Jacksonville Bank, 243 Ark. 977, 980, 423 S.W.2d
273, 274-75 (1968); Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273
Md. 592, 604, 332 A.2d 1, 8 (1975); William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Cummins Diesel
Engines, Inc., 252 Md. 611, 615-16, 250 A.2d 886, 889 (1969); Zabriskie Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 446, 240 A.2d 195, 198 (1968); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 632, 174 S.E.2d 511, 518 (1970); T. Quinn, supra
note 3, 2-401[A][1]; Dolan, supra note 124, at 1192; Jackson & Peters, supra note
124, at 912; Skilton, supra note 25, at 17-18; see U.C.C. § 2-101 official comment
(1977); id. § 2-401 & official comment 1; id. § 2-505 official comment 1; id. § 9-202
& official comment.
161. U.C.C. § 2-505 official comment 1 (1977). The court in Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1968), stated that "a
buyer who makes a purchase . . . in good faith with a full understanding it is a
binding contract, who knowingly signs a retail installment payment obligation and
trades in an old car in addition must.., be deemed a buyer in the ordinary course of
business, without regard to the technicalities of when title is to pass." Id. at 270, 288
N.Y.S.2d at 534 (emphasis added); accord Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119
Ariz. 176, 177-78, 580 P.2d 8, 9-10 (1978); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73
Ill. App. 3d 475, 478-79, 392 N.E.2d 344, 345-46 (1979).
162. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1977).
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quires a sale, 63 courts that emphasize the importance of title in the
definition of sale require passage of title before conferring BIOC
status. 16 4 Inclusion of title in the definition of sale, however, was
intended to serve the limited purpose of distinguishing a transaction
that is properly characterized as a sale for Article 2 purposes from one
in which transfer of ownership is not contemplated, as in a bailment
or lease. 6 5 "[B]eyond that [title] serves no function"6 6 and its use in
the determination of BIOC status "flies in the face of the drafters'
antipathy to the use of 'title' as a Code problem solver." 6 7
The Code title rules may provide a certain degree of flexibility in
that title may pass at any time after identification to which the parties
agree' (8 or, under limited circumstances, at time of contracting.'6 "
The general rule, however, is that title passes when the seller has
completed his performance with respect to physical delivery of the
goods. 70  This rule may lead to harsh results when delivery has not
yet occurred. For example, in Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, lnc.,171
the leading case decided under the title theory, 72 the buyer had
163. Id. § 1-201(9); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-W., 90 Misc. 2d
868, 870, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc.,
59 Wis. 2d 219, 239, 208 N.W.2d 97, 106 (1973); B. Clark, supra note 3, § 3.4[2], at
3-22; Dolan, supra note 124, at 1154; Skilton, supra note 25, at 16; Possession or
Title, supra note 12, at 697.
164. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ca.
App. 488, 492-94, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1974); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine
Midland Bank-W., 90 Misc. 2d 868, 870, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 239, 208 N.W.2d 97, 106 (1973);
cf. Jones v. One Fifty Foot Gulfstar Motor Sailing Yacht, 625 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir.
1980) (legal title required in admiralty petitory action).
165. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-106[A][1]; see U.C.C. § 2-401 official comment 1
(1977).
166. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-106[A][1].
167. Id. 9-307[A][81, at S9-136 (Supp. 1981); accord 1955 Report, supra note 4,
at 451; Skilton, supra note 25, at 17-18.
168. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (1977); e.g., Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119
Ariz. 176, 177, 580 P.2d 8, 8-9 (1978); Bowman v. American Home Assurance Co.,
190 Neb. 810, 813, 213 N.W.2d 446, 448 (1973); Graves Constr. Co. v. Rockingham
Nat'l Bank, 220 Va. 844, 849-50, 263 S.E.2d 408, 412 (1980).
169. U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b) (1977). "[TJitle passes at the time and place of contract-
ing" where delivery is to be made without moving the goods, the goods are already
identified and no documents are to be delivered. Id. BIOC status has been found at
time of contracting under § 2-401(3)(b). Jones v. One Fifty Foot Gulfstar Motor
Sailing Yacht, 625 F.2d 44, 49 (5th Cir. 1980); International Harvester Credit Corp.
v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ca. App. 488, 492-94, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433-34
(1974).
170. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1977); e.g., Coast Scopitone, Inc. v. Self, 127 Ga. App.
124, 127, 192 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1972); Underwood v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d
635, 639 (Ky. 1965); Gantman v. Paul, 203 Pa. Super. 158, 161-62, 199 A.2d 519,
520 (1964).
171. 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
172. See Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-W., 90 Misc. 2d 868, 870-71,
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tendered substantially all of the contract price,'7 3 and both parties
agreed that identification had taken place."4 In addition, the buyer
had obtained possession of the goods by a replevin action.'75  The
court, however, viewed the replevin as "an unusual and drastic mode
of recourse to secure the rights of a purchaser," 7 0 and further noted
that the parties had apparently intended title to pass on delivery.'"7
The court, therefore, determined that title had not yet passed and that
the buyer failed to qualify as a BIOC. 178  Nevertheless, as the Chry-
sler court itself recognized, "[f]rom the viewpoint of equity, this is an
unsatisfactory result." 17  The buyer did not prevail despite having
discharged his obligation under the contract because delivery, a rela-
tively late point in the transaction, had not yet occurred.
E. Identification
Identification "specif[ies] the goods to which the contract refers so
that the contract can apply to no others," ,s0 and represents the point
at which the buyer first acquires property rights in the goods he has
contracted to buy.""' Section 2-501 of the Code provides a set of rules
outlining how and when identification occurs.' 82  When the buyer
selects an item out of the seller's inventory in a present sale, identifica-
tion occurs at the time of contracting.'8 3 Otherwise, identification
occurs when the seller fills the buyer's order by designating particular
goods for delivery to the buyer,18 4 or in any other way and at any time
to which the parties agree.'s
396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1977); B. Clark, supra note 3, § 3.4[2], at 3-22; T.
Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8] (1978 & Supp. 1981); Dolan, supra note 124, at
1154-59; Jackson & Peters, supra note 124, at 952; Skilton, supra note 25, at 16-21.
173. 59 Wis. 2d at 226, 241-42, 208 N.W.2d at 100, 108.
174. Id. at 240, 208 N.W.2d at 107; see T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at
9-192; Skilton, supra note 25, at 16.
175. 59 Wis. 2d at 228, 208 N.W.2d at 101.
176. Id. at 241, 208 N.W.2d at 107.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 241-42, 208 N.W.2d at 108.
179. Id.
180. Rivera, Identification of Goods and Casualty to Identified Goods Under
Article Two of the UCC, 13 Ind. L. Rev. 637, 640 (1980) (emphasis omitted); accord
Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Indus., Inc., 82 Ill. App. 3d 662, 670, 403 N.E.2d 1,
7 (1980); 2 R. Anderson, supra note 29, § 2-501:4, at 60-61.
181. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-501[A][1]. Identification represents the time
when the "buyer obtains a special property and an insurable interest" in existing
goods. U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (1977). It is also the point at which an interest in goods may
first pass under Article 2. Id. § 2-105(2).
182. U.C.C. § 2-501 (1977); T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-501[A][1]-[2].
183. U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(a) (1977); T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-501[A][2].
184. U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(b) (1977); 2 R. Anderson, supra note 29, § 2-501:4, at 61;
T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-501[A][2].
185. U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (1977).
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Use of identification in determining BIOC status appears to be the
modern trend.186  The court in Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales,
Inc.18 7 confronted the buyer-secured party conflict. After rejecting
title, delivery and receipt as requirements for BIOC status, 188 the
court concluded that the buyer qualified as a buyer in the ordinary
course at the time of identification of the goods to the contract. 8
This conclusion was based on the court's recognition of the equities of
the conflict: "The risk of loss . . . quite properly should be on the
lender rather than on the buyer." 0
A number of factors compel assignment of the risk to the secured
party. The lender makes an informed decision' 1' to assume the risk of
engaging in inventory financing because of the possibility of profiting
186. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 749 (3d
Cir. 1979); Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1979);
Dolan, supra note 124, at 1154-57; Schimberg, Secured Transactions, 35 Bus. Law.
1165, 1175 (1980); Possession or Title, supra note 12, at 698-700.
187. 404 A.2d 842 (R.I. 1979).
188. Id. at 845. The court referred to possession, id., but this concept implies
receipt. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
189. 404 A.2d at 8,45. The court based much of its reasoning on the article by
Dolan, supra note 124. See id. at 845 n.7.
190. 404 A.2d at 845; accord Rome Bank & Trust Co. v. Bradshaw, 143 Ga. App.
152, 157, 237 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1977); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill.
App. 3d 475, 481, 392 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1979); Dugan, supra note 31, at 361-62;
Skilton, supra note 25, at 3-4; cf. Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz.
176, 178, 580 P.2d 8, 10 (1978) (in contest between retail and inventory financers,
court allocated risk of loss to inventory financer); International Harvester Credit
Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 496, 211 S.E.2d 430, 435
(1974) (same); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d
525, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (same).
191. Lenders usually have access to a great deal of financial data regarding the
debtor's financial status, including financial statements, various asset ratios and
credit agency reports. P. Smith, Economics of Financial Institutions and Markets
149-50 (1971); Gordon, The Prepaying Buyer: Second Class Citizenship Under Uni-
form Commercial Code Article 2, 63 Nw. U. L. Rev. 565, 577-78 (1968); Helman,
Ostensible Ownership and the Uniform Commercial Code, 83 Com. L.J. 25, 30-32
(1978). In view of this readily available and comprehensive information, the argu-
ment that finding BIOC status when the goods are in the seller's possession might be
misleading to lenders is unpersuasive. Gordon, supra, at 577; Helman, supra, at 25,
32. This concept, known as the doctrine of ostensible ownership, addresses the
situation in which "a party, who [is] in possession of another's property, is held out as
the owner of the property under such circumstances as would be reasonably calcu-
lated to induce creditors to extend credit to him on the faith of his apparent owner-
ship." Helman, supra, at 25. The theory should not be used as a bar to finding BIOC
status before buyer takes possession of the goods because it is clear that modern
lenders do not rely on inventory in a seller's showroom in making credit decisions, but
instead rely on the financial data discussed above. Gordon, supra, at 577; Helman,
supra, at 32. But see Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 240, 208
N.W.2d 97, 107 (1973) (court found the ostensible ownership argument persuasive
and therefore required possession by the buyer, at least as applied to the facts of that
case).
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from the associated paper purchases; 192 the buyer merely places him-
self on the market to buy goods, in the process of which he is exposed
to the risk of buying encumbered goods.' 9 3 Additionally, the lender is
in a better position than the buyer to protect against the risk of loss.1 4
He may monitor the seller's activities by, for example, requiring vari-
ous financial reports and conducting physical audits of the inven-
tory. 15 The mere fact that the security agreement contains restric-
tions on the seller's conduct regarding the collateral underlying the
loan, however, does not mean that the seller is prohibited from selling
the goods. 196 Accordingly, because information concerning possible
restrictions is rarely, if ever, available to the buyer, 197 he cannot
effectively protect himself against buying goods in violation of a secur-
ity agreement.
Finally, the lender is in a better position to neutralize the effect of
loss of the goods. When a buyer is found to be a BLOC and thus
allowed possession of the goods, the secured lender will still be granted
a recovery because floor-plan financing agreements usually provide
that the lender will have access to the proceeds of sale.19 Even when
this is not possible, 9 as when the proceeds are dissipated before
default,20 0 the lender can build the cost of losses into the cost of credit
by adjusting interest rates in accordance with the degree of risk per-
192. Possession or Title, supra note 12, at 695 n.4. The profit made by the lender
on chattel paper purchases greatly surpasses that made on inventory financing. 2 C.
Gilmore, supra note 15, § 27.1, at 719; R. Speidel, supra note 12, at 218, 257;
Biborosch, Floor Plan Financing, 77 Banking L.J. 725, 727 (1960); Levie, supra note
43, at 955-56. It has been referred to as the "pot of gold at the end of the . . .
rainbow." Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L.J.
1057, 1102 (1954).
193. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
194. Dugan, supra note 31, at 361.
195. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ca.
App. 488, 496, 211 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1974); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73
Ill. App. 3d 475, 480-81, 392 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1979); Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Biborosch,
supra note 192, at 736-40; Dolan, supra note 124, at 1159; Jackson & Kronman,
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143, 1150 (1979);
Levie, supra note 43, at 956 & n.38; Possession or Title, supra note 8. at 700.
196. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 15.
199. See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133
Ga. App. 488, 492, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1974); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56
Misc. 2d 261, 269-70, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 533-34 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Associates Discount
Corp. v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 612, 220 A.2d 621, 623-24 (1966), in which
inventory financers lost to retail financers their rights in chattel paper as proceeds
under § 9-308(b).
200. See 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 27.1, at 720; Skilton, supra note 25, at 77.
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ceived.20 1 Moreover, the lender may decline to lend.202  Buyers are
not in such a position. If he is not held to be a BIOC, the buyer
receives no recovery.20 3 In the absence of recovery, not all buyers are
able to pass on the loss. 20 4
Although use of identification would lead to equitable results in the
buyer-secured party conflict, it has been suggested that such an ap-
proach may be inappropriate2 0 5 in view of the Code drafters' observa-
tion in an official comment that identification is of "limited effect. 20 0
This comment has been subject to controversy, however, because
identification is a threshold event that is required for a number of
valuable Code rights to arise.20 7 For example, Article 2 provides that
on identification, a buyer may obtain the right to goods on the seller's
insolvency.208  He may also pursue a replevin action 20 9 and sue third
parties for injury to goods.210  Furthermore, once goods have been
identified, a seller may pursue an action for the price .2 1  Article 2
also provides that on identification a creditor may, under limited
circumstances, void sales made by his debtor-seller.2 12 In addition,
201. R. Posner, supra note 80, at 293-94; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 195, at
1148-51; see P. Smith, supra note 191, at 148-53; Dugan, supra note 31, at 361-62.
202. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 496, 211 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1974); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73
Ill. App. 3d 475, 480, 392 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1979); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp,
56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1968); see P. Smith, supra
note 191, at 148-51; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 195, at 1149-51.
203. There are, however, other Code sections under which buyers who fail to
qualify under § 9-307(1) might prevail, although they too have high hurdles. U.C.C.
§ 9-301(1)(c) (1977) (if security interest is unperfected, buyer prevails "to the extent
that he gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the
security interest and before it is perfected"); id. § 9-306(2) (if sale is authorized by
secured party, buyer prevails); see E. Reiley, supra note 22, § 8.3, at 8-7 to -8.
204. This is at least the case with individual retail buyers. See Dugan, supra note
31, at 362. As for commercial buyers, who comprise the balance of the BIOC class,
the cases routinely find BIOC status notwithstanding potential ability to spread the
losses of buying encumbered goods. E.g., Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F.
Supp. 599, 604 (E.D. Ark. 1964) (dealer of aircraft); Bitzer-Croft Motors, Inc. v.
Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1, 12, 401 N.E.2d 1340, 1348 (1980)
(same); Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546, 549
(Tex. 1970) (wholesale dealer of automobiles).
205. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-136 (Supp. 1981).
206. U.C.C. § 2-501 official comment 2 (1977) ("In view of the limited effect
given to identification .... the general policy is to resolve all doubts in favor of
identification.").
207. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-501[A][1]; Dolan, supra note 124, at 1154, 1157-
58; Rivera, supra note 180, at 639.
208. U.C.C. § 2-502 (1977); Rivera, supra note 180, at 639.
209. U.C.C. § 2-716(3) (1977); Rivera, supra note 180, at 639.
210. U.C.C. § 2-722(a) (1977); T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-501[A][1], at 2-268.
211. U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b) (1977); T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-501[A][1], at 2-268;
Rivera, supra note 180, at 639.
212. Dolan, supra note 124, at 1158; Possession or Title, supra note 12, at 699-
700; see U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (1977).
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under Article 9, the security interest of a secured party attaches at the
point when goods purchased by his debtor are identified to the con-
tract.21 3 Irrespective of the comment's assertion regarding "limited
effect,"'21 4 therefore, determination of BIOC status as of identification
is consistent with the Code scheme of recognizing important rights at
that point in the transaction.
Moreover, because identification occurs at a relatively early point
in the contract, 1 5 its use as a reference point for determining BIOC
status gives maximum vitality to the Code policy of protecting buyers
from hidden interests in goods.216 It is arguable, however, that sever-
ing security interests at the point of identification may discourage
inventory financing.217  Because a lender's principal objective is to
purchase its debtor-seller's chattel paper at attractive rates,21 8 such a
result seems unlikely. Furthermore, because a lender's ability to pro-
tect itself219 and to recoup its losses220 places it in an advantageous
position, the equities favor the buyer.22 ' Finally, finding BIOC status
as of identification would further the general Code policy of expand-
213. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1977). A security interest attaches upon the coalescence of
an effective security agreement, value and debtor's rights in the goods. See supra note
3. Because identification will usually mark the time when the debtor first gains rights
in the goods he purchases, it will also usually mark the time when the secured party's
interest attaches. Dolan, supra note 124, at 1157-58; Rivera, supra note 180, at 639;
see In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 327, 337 (Bankr. D. Me. (1968).
214. Although the official comments are persuasive and aid in the interpretation
of the Code, they are not controlling. Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075,
1084 n.15 (8th Cir. 1969); First State Bank v. Clark, 91 N.M. 117, 119, 570 P.2d
1144, 1146 (1977).
215. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 1 9-307[A][8], at S9-136 (Supp. 1981); Dolan, supra
note 124, at 1157; Possession or Title, supra note 12, at 698 & n.25.
216. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
217. Possession or Title, supra note 12, at 699-700; see Dolan, supra note 124, at
1157.
218. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
221. The New York Court of Appeals, in Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milli-
ken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976), determined that
a buyer may prevail as a BIOC even when the secured party is in possession of the
goods. Id. at 634-36, 350 N.E.2d at 591-92, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 261. One commentator,
who advanced identification as the most appropriate reference point for determina-
tion of BIOC status, Dolan, supra note 124, at 1157-59, criticized the Tanbro
decision, and argued that the identification rule should exclude those buyers whose
sellers were not in possession of the goods at the time of the sale. Id. at 1186-92;
accord Kriendler, The Uniform Commercial Code and Priority Rights Between the
Seller in Possession and a Good Faith Third-Party Purchaser, 82 Com. L.J. 86, 89-90
(1977); Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply
Against a Secured Party in Possession?, 33 Bus. Law. 153, 160 (1977). Other com-
mentators, however, approve of the Tanbro holding. Birnbaum, Section 9-307(1) of
the Uniform Commercial Code Versus Possessory Security Interests-A Reply to
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ing commerce22 2 by minimizing buyers' fears of buying encumbered
goods. 2 3 Its use in the BIOC context thus "promote[s] the interests of
buyers, . . . the interests of a commercial society. . . . [and] fosters
sales,"'224 maintaining the delicate balance between buyers and se-
cured parties intended by the Code drafters. 2 .
III. ANOTHER CONTEXT: SECURED PARTY V. CHATTEL PAPER
PURCHASER
The determination of when a buyer becomes a BIOC may affect the
determination of whether a chattel paper purchaser will prevail over
an inventory financer. 2 6  As in the modified hypothetical in the
Introduction, when S is in need of cash, he will often sell the chattel
paper to a third party, the chattel paper purchaser.227 The chattel
paper purchaser obtains a derivative security interest in the goods.2 28
If S defaults on the loan agreement with L, and B is found to be a
BIOC, L's security interest in the goods will be severed. 22  When the
proceeds of the sale of the chattel paper have been dissipated by S,2 0
L will claim the chattel paper itself as proceeds of the sale. 2 31 The
battle is then between L and the chattel paper purchaser for the
chattel paper.2 32
Professor Homer Kripke, 33 Bus. Law. 2607 (1977); Gottleib, Section 9-307(1) and
Tanbro Fabrics: A Further Response, 33 Bus. Law. 2611 (1977). Espousing the better
view, one commentator argued that to amend § 9-307(1) to exclude the secured party
in possession from its reach "would not help but [would] hamper and frustrate
normal business sales activities." Id. at 2615.
222. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
223. See Dolan, supra note 124, at 1157; Possession or Title, supra note 12, at 698
& n.25; cf. Sebrite Corp. v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 272 S.C. 483, 487, 252 S.E.2d
873, 875 (1979) (requiring innocent purchaser or retail lender to investigate seller's
ability to sell unencumbered goods would "stagnate retail sales so necessary to
commerce").
224. Dolan, supra note 124, at 1157.
225. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
228. See U.C.C. § 9-105 official comment 3 (1977); Skilton, supra note 25, at 77-
78.
229. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1977); see Wickes Corp. v. General Elec. Credit Corp.,
363 So. 2d 56, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 492, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1974);
Associates Discount Corp. v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 612, 220 A.2d 621, 623
(1966).
230. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
231. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 492, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1974); Associates Discount Corp. v. Old
Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 612, 220 A.2d 621, 623 (1966); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note
15, § 27.1, at 720; Levie, supra note 43, at 955-56; Skilton, supra note 25, at 77-78.
232. Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 176, 580 P.2d 8, 8
(1978); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 27.1, at 718; Skilton, supra note 25, at 76-77;
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Section 9-308 of the Code provides that chattel paper purchasers
who give value and take possession of the paper in the ordinary course
of their business prevail over inventory lenders. This preference for
the chattel paper purchaser over the inventory financer -' 4 is designed
to promote competition in consumer financing 35 and to prevent the
inventory financer from monopolizing the acquisition of seller's chat-
tel paper.2 36 Therefore, under section 9-308, the chattel paper pur-
chaser wins the chattel paper.
If B had failed to qualify as a BIOC, however, L's original security
interest in the goods would continue. 237 In that case, although the
chattel paper purchaser would still prevail as to the chattel paper
itself, his derivative interest in the goods would appear to be encum-
bered by L's continuing interest.2 3  Yet, sections 9-306(5)(b) and (d)
provide that if the chattel paper purchaser takes the necessary steps to
perfect his interest in the goods underlying the paper, his interest in
the goods will be superior to that of the inventory lender.3 Some
courts have used these sections to allow chattel paper purchasers to
repossess goods.240 Commentators have also recognized this section as
determinative of the priorities between these two secured parties.241
One commentator, however, while recognizing that sections 9-
306(5)(b) and (d) operate in conjunction with section 9-308,242 has
suggested that courts, in determining that the chattel paper purchaser
prevailed over the inventory lender, were in fact relying on the buyer
in ordinary course having first severed the inventory lender's interest
in the goods.243 In criticizing this result, the commentator pointed
out that if the buyer had not qualified as a BIOC, the chattel paper
purchaser might not have prevailed..2 44
see T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-307[A][8], at S9-134 to -135 (Supp. 1981); Levie,
supra note 43, at 955-56.
233. U.C.C. § 9-308(b) (1977).
234. T. Quinn, supra note 3, 9-308[A][4].
235. Skilton, supra note 25, at 78 n.189.
236. Id.; see 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 15, § 27.1, at 719-20.
237. Skilton, supra note 25, at 78. This is unless the sale was otherwise authorized
under § 9-306(2). U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1977); Skilton, supra note 25, at 78.
238. Skilton, supra note 25, at 78.
239. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b), (d) (1977); 4 R. Anderson, supra note 29, § 9-306:220;
W. Hawkland, supra note 15, at 731-32.
240. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ca.
App. 488, 492 & n.1, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433 & n.1 (1974); Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 269, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 533 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
241. 4 R. Anderson, supra note 29, § 9-306:22; W. Hawkland, supra note 15, at
730-32; Skilton, supra note 25, at 83 & n.199.
242. Skilton, supra note 25, at 83 & n.199.
243. Id. at 77-78. In these cases, the buyer had qualified as a BIOC. International
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 496, 211
S.E.2d 430, 435 (1974); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 269, 288
N.Y.S.2d 525, 533 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
244. Skilton, supra note 25, at 79, 87.
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In the event that this analysis is correct, the chattel paper pur-
chaser's ability to prevail over the inventory lender will depend on the
buyer's qualification as a BIOC. It is important, therefore, to find
BIOC status at identification to the contract. As a relatively early
point in the transaction, 245 it will allow the chattel paper purchaser to
prevail more frequently, thereby serving the purpose underlying sec-
tion 9-308.246
CONCLUSION
The fundamental purpose of the Code is to facilitate the proper
functioning of the marketplace by promoting uniformity and cer-
tainty. Because the BIOC exception of Article 9 does not specify when
a buyer may partake of its protection, the needed certainty is sorely
lacking. Analysis of the points on the transactional continuum, the
245. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text. The question of when a buyer
becomes a BIOC also arises in an entrustment situation. The Code provides that
"[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant vho deals in goods of that kind
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of
business." U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1977). This provision takes effect when, for example, a
person leaves a watch with a jeweler for repair, and the jeweler then sells it to a
buyer. If the buyer qualifies as a BIOC, he takes the watch free and clear of the
owner's interest. 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 458; T. Quinn, supra note 3, 2-
403[A][3]. The purpose of § 2-403 is to "protect a person from a third-party interest
in goods purchased from the general inventory of a merchant regardless of that
merchant's actual authority to sell those goods." Mattek v. Malofsky, 42 Wis. 2d 16,
19, 165 N.W.2d 406, 408 (1969). It has been stated that passage of title is not
necessary for a buyer to prevail under § 2-403. Jackson & Peters, supra note 124, at
952 & n.163. One commentator, however, has argued that the buyer must be in
possession to qualify as a BIOC under § 2-403. Smith, supra note 124, at 61, In most
instances, however, such a requirement is moot, because the buyer is already In
possession of the goods by the time the owner learns of the sale. See, e.g., Simson v.
Moon, 137 Ga. App. 82, 83, 222 S.E.2d 873, 873 (1975), appeal dismissed, 236 Ga.
786, 225 S.E.2d 314 (1976); Rockwin Corp. v. Kincaid, 124 Ga. App. 570, 570, 184
S.E.2d 509, 510 (1971); Mattek v. Malofsky, 42 Wis. 2d 16, 19, 165 N.W.2d 406, 408
(1969). Furthermore, § 25 of the Uniform Sales Act. the predecessor of § 2-403,
expressly required delivery. Uniform Sales Act § 25 (1906), 1 U.L.A. 390 (1950). It Is
arguable that the omission of such an express requirement in § 2-403 was intentional.
Cf. 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 232 (discussing absence of delivery requirement in §
1-201(9) BIOC definition in § 9-307 context). A requirement that identification have
occurred, however, is reasonable. Because the question of whether § 2-403 will allow
a buyer to prevail usually arises in a present sale, the buyer will be in possession and
identification will have taken place. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. In
rare instances, however, identification will have taken place before the buyer is in
possession, as when he contracts to buy a used car that the owner has entrusted to the
seller. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. Allowing the buyer to prevail in
such a case is justified by the policy of § 2-403(2) of giving strong protection to the
innocent buyer, who relies on the seller's apparent authority in an entrustment
situation. See Simson v. Moon, 137 Ga. App. 82, 85-86, 222 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1975),
appeal dismissed, 236 Ga. 786, 225 S.E.2d 314 (1976).
1982] BUYER IN ORDINARY COURSE 687
Code scheme and the parties' equities indicates that identification of
goods to the contract is the proper point at which BIOC status should
arise. The selection of identification recognizes the buyer's Article 2
rights as well as the mercantile nature of the secured lender's interest.
Lenders are in the favorable position of being able to protect them-
selves and to recoup their losses. In contrast, buyers stand to lose all
that they bring to the transaction.
Lori S. Segal
